Russia’s new perestroika
By Andrei Piontkovsky
Commentators in Russia and abroad are wondering if there is any hope of a Medvedev liberalization, a de-Putinization, a possible thaw and perestroika. If this were true, it would lead to people being allowed to criticize the authorities on television, to political prisoners being released and to investigating murders in which the special services were involved. If we really are to going to understand the current Russian regime and try to work out what it is going to do next, we need to recall the history of the evolution of the Soviet nomenclature.
Every day we are amazed, or actually no longer surprised, by the re-emergence of features from our Soviet past. We are today ruled by that same, immortal Soviet nomenclature. It has become younger over the last 20 years and seriously shaken up its personnel (primarily by means of an enormous intake from the KGB/FSB). It has also acquired a colossal amount of property. In Soviet terminology, we would say that today’s Central Committee members, secretaries of regional committees and KGB generals (whatever their titles may be now) have become multi-millionaires in economic terms. And modern ‘politburo members’ have become multi-billionaires.
So is this “new class” going to consider liberalizing the regime? In its almost 100-year history, the Soviet-Russian nomenclature has twice announced a thaw from the top. The first time was in 1953, after the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, and the second in 1985, after the collective death of the former politburo. In both cases, this enabled millions to take a real step towards freedom. The first thaw literally brought freedom to hundreds of thousands of people who were released from the camps.
But these were secondary, side effects of the perestroika. Each time, the elite were primarily concerned to address their own problems. The 1953-56 thaw proclaimed the first Magna Carta, as it were, for the nomenclature barons. They blackened Stalin’s reputation (perhaps even killing him first), released political prisoners, cautiously opened the country’s borders and introduced minimal freedoms. Thus they consolidated their right to life, ensuring at the same time that no new dictator could dispatch them to the camps. The newspaper Pravda noted smugly at the time that the prevailing atmosphere was one of “consideration towards the party cadres.”
“Consideration” included such modest bourgeois charms as the closed distribution centers for food and goods accessible only to members of the party's Central or Regional Committee, a deerskin cap, a state dacha, an annual holiday at a Sochi sanatorium belonging to the Central or Regional, Committee. The most audacious also allowed themselves a little pilfering. These gentle pleasures lasted for 30 years until the young Komsomol-KGB members came of age. They had a clear idea of the Western standards of elite consumption, and demanded much more than “consideration.” They became the driving force of perestroika and the triumphant thermidor of the Communist nomenclature.
Whatever the personal aspirations of the father of Perestroika may have been (and he would probably not be able to articulate them clearly today), objectively speaking it was the beginning of a gigantic operation to convert the absolute collective political power of the nomenclature into the enormous personal financial power of its individual representatives. The final stage of the operation (which we have seen recently) was their regaining of absolute political power.
The current generation of the ruling nomenclature owns enormous amounts of property. So they do not—nor cannot—have the remotest incentive to liberalize. On the contrary, they have far greater reason than their historical predecessors to fear even the slightest increase in freedom of information. This is because journalists, parliament and, finally, the courts would then immediately start investigating the origin, scale and structure of their wealth.
As they fight over the rapidly diminishing financial spoils, the various clans of today’s kleptocracy may have different views on tactics for maintaining their control over society. However, the Kremlin’s “liberals” and “siloviki” (security services or military personnel) are united in their fear of the Russian people, whom they have pillaged together. They will never allow freedom of information or real democracy.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent “liberal” gestures (the interview with Novaya Gazeta, the meeting with human rights advocates) all bear the hallmarks of a propaganda operation. He was, however, extremely frank in his interview with NTV on April 19, 2009: “I believe that during the crisis, we must concentrate on finding solutions to existing economic problems, rather than making political reforms of any kind.”
As for the release of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's lawyer, Svetlana Bakhmina, who was imprisoned on false charges, my first reaction is to be glad her prolonged sufferings are at an end. But the last thing I want to do is thank her tormentors for this, whatever camp they belong to—“liberal” or “siloviki.” Their behavior towards Bakhmina during the last year has been particularly disgusting.
Initially, Medvedev was not allowed to pardon her, which demonstrated where he really belonged in the Kremlin hierarchy. He swallowed this obediently. Prolonged attempts were evidently made to break this woman, who had recently given birth, and force her to give the evidence they required for Khodorkovsky’s second trial. They made her write in her statement that “she regretted her crimes and was now on the path of active repentance.”
In the end, even the stupidest sadists in the Russian political leadership realized that this performance was reminiscent of the Stalin show trials of the 1930s and could well have a reverse effect, with negative consequences for them.
So, unwillingly the executioners let their victim go. Optimists can call this Medvedev’s perestroika, if they like.
- Andrei Piontkovsky is the executive director of the Strategic Studies Center in Moscow and a well-known political analyst in Russia.
